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Abstract
The article takes up the theme of Agamben’s violence without a form of justice and reads 
Shakespeare’s tragedy as spanned between Cordelia’s “nothing” at the start of the play 
and Lear’s “never” at its end. It also approaches a question of the relationship between, 
in Rousseau’s word, “l’homme naturel” and “citoyen.” Lear’s push towards a position of 
being “unaccommodated” suggests a move away from the organization of life previously 
holding its rule over men towards a marginal, peripheral zone with uncertain rules where 
man has to risk his own decisions rather than merely follow the custom.
1. “Shut up your doors my Lord, ‘tis a wild night” (2.2)
Before we hear these words thunders reverberate in a gray distance. Storm and 
Tempest: Shakespeare’s indication punctuates a long speech in which the old king 
looks upon the course his life has recently taken not only as a personal demise 
(what he refers to as the “fi lial ingratitude,” 3.4), but also as a collapse of a certain 
paradigm within which human life makes sense. Underneath personal disaster 
a more serious calamity is brewing, and we constantly have to read Shakespeare’s 
tragedy on these two platforms. Dramatic, but minor, breakdowns within the family 
bespeak major cracks upon the structure of the general order. Kent discovers this 
truth. Having listed transgressions again the old king, he sees them as indicators 
of an apocalyptic crisis:, “[…] or something deeper, / Whereof (perchance) these 
are but furnishings” (3.1). Thus, we receive a hermeneutic instruction: to under-
stand the course of events, we have to pay attention to details and what seems 
insignifi cant on a larger scale. Like shut doors and storminess of a night. This is 
a golden rule of manoeuvring in a gray space. “This attention to the genuinely 
insignifi cant – that which signifi es despite all signs to the contrary, that is, in 
spite of itself, too – […] constitutes the one rule of thumb that can be counted 
on when operating in areas termed gray” (Fiorestos 125).
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2. “Shut up your doors […]” (2.2)
The insistent accent upon barricading oneself against possible incursions from the 
outside is a constant note in the drama. The politics of Regan and Goneril aim 
at separating their territories from external pressures and gradual elimination of 
what they consider residues of the old order embodied by their father. What the 
two daughters construct is a system of immunological resistance against foreign 
viruses and those elements of the organism which potentially may jeopardize the 
homeostasis of the body politic. Goneril’s confl ict with the father hinges on the 
threat which the supposedly unruly behaviour of Lear’s entourage poses to, as 
she puts it, “wholesome weal” (1.4). Hence, the necessity of suspending recently 
(as Lear notices, it all has happened “within a fortnight,” 1.4) endorsed contracts 
and the decision to implement a special law, a law of exception. She calls for 
“instant remedy” (1.4) which under diff erent circumstances would be shameful 
and disrespectful. Her declaration comes as the eff ect of “necessity”: “which 
else were shame, that then necessity / Will call discreet proceeding” (1.4). We 
have then two processes which shape the course of events: (1) immunization of 
a territory, and (2) exceptionalization of law under the impact of “necessity.” What 
is interesting, however, is that the immunization is directed, for the time being, 
against one’s own citizens. No foreign army threatens Regan and Goneril yet; it is 
their own people that raise fears and make them bar the gates to their fortresses. 
Characteristically, this is what Machiavelli advices princes to do: “a prince who 
fears his own people more than foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who 
has greater fear of foreigners than of his own people ought to do without them” 
(118). Fear of one’s own people and a constant risk of misrecognition of their 
intentions are important subject matters of Lear. 
3. “[…] yet our power / Shall do a courtesy to our wrath […]” (3.7)
Closing borders, barricading doors, sealing off  of one’s domestic territory is well 
ministered to by these two processes. Both of them serve the ideal of homogeneity 
which defi nes and protects domestic political interests by demonstrating their 
superiority over everything foreign. The universalization of the domestic is the 
name of the game. Roberto Esposito tells us that “the very essence of immuniza-
tion at its most violent [is] border closings that do not tolerate anything from the 
outside, that exclude the very idea of an outside, that do not admit any foreignness 
that might threaten the logic of One-and-everything [l’Uno-tutto]” (63). Closing 
down borders is, in fact, closing down of a community which now is substituted 
by a system of terror the gravitational force of which is related to property and 
power. What was common now is replaced by what is ascribed to particular indi-
viduals. Lear himself follows the same logic which leads eventually to parcelling 
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out areas of the common territory and giving them proper names and borders. 
“Against the boundlessness of the community, which is absoluta and exlege, the 
individual and the state are born under the sign of separation and autonomy with 
regard to what is internal to their own proper borders” (Esposito 128). 
This prepares the ground for anger as a means of defending one’s interests 
by exercising a law which goes beyond the juridical restriction of the legal system 
itself. Cornwall’s dictum “Thou well we may not pass upon his life / Without the 
form of justice, yet our power / Shall do a courtesy to our wrath, which men /
May blame, but not control” (3.7) is dense with references to the situation of 
an état de sičge. It recognizes law as the main organizing principle of action in 
a society which always needs and cannot survive without a “form of justice.” Yet, 
at the same time, it gives way to an emotional, aff ective response (“wrath”) which 
law, under normal circumstances blind and insensitive, always tries to control 
and moderate. And, fi nally, it both acknowledges and shuns the sovereignty of 
the people who may critically evaluate a controversial action of the state but will 
have to remain inactive. This divorce between the “men” and the “sovereign” is 
particularly painful, as it drives a wedge between law and morality, politics and 
moral imagination. Even more seriously, what Cornwall declares is a gap between 
executive power and legislative power: we may act, even though we know our 
action to be unlawful because the action, due to the necessity, will bear the force 
of the law. Executive power is thus radically liberated; it can be judged (“blame”) 
and yet such judgment will remain an empty gesture (“not control”). Law seems 
able to subsist only by capturing anomie, just as language can subsist only by 
grasping the nonlingustic. In both cases, the confl ict seems to concern an empty 
space: on the one hand, anomie, juridical vacuum, and, on the other, pure being, 
devoid of any determination or real predicate” (Agamben 60). As a result, we 
obtain violence without a “form of justice.” The empty space between life and 
law will turn out to be Gloucester’s empty eye-socket.
4. “If wolves had at thy gate howl’d that stern time […]” (3.7)
The gate comes back, and evidently it is locked, bolted up against not only any 
kind of foreignnessbut also against the time which is stern. This qualifi cation 
refers certainly to the storm which fi rst approaches from a distance and then 
rages across moors. But the time is stern not only because of a brutal wind and 
severe rain; it is stern because it rises and speaks against human actions which 
time fi nds un-timely. One of the etymological paths of stern takes us to the 
Gothic andstaurran meaning “to murmur against,” and the other brings us to 
the vicinity of Swedish stursk referring to something “refractory.” Gates of the 
community are closed and barred which signals a dissolution of the (always open) 
community supplanted by the (always favouring borders) immunity. Gates bolted 
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up, being a fi gure of what in a modern state becomes “an enormous apparatus 
of immunization,” indicate that “the concept of immunitas has to be contrasted 
directly with that of communitas” (Esposito 127). Everything that takes place in 
King Lear confi rms this diagnosis. Gloucester, whose eyes have been torn out, 
must be relegated outside the city walls as a viral body of (as Regan puts it) 
“a fi lthy traitor” (3.7), one who fl irts with and invites insanity into the rational 
order of the city (according to Regan, Gloucester supports “the lunatic King,” 
3.7), and hence his place is on a far and despised margin of the orderly world. 
“Turn out this eyeless villain” (3.7), commands Cornwall. But Lear himself has 
not behaved diff erently when he disinherited Cordelia for not complying with the 
rules of his contest. By disclaiming his paternal care, he sentences Cordelia to 
being a stranger in her own native realm, and therefore automatically she must 
become, like Kent, the object of all kinds of immunizing actions. Her foreignness 
is radical: from now on she will be more barbarian than barbarians themselves. 
“Here I disclaim all my paternal care, / Propinquity and property of blood, / And 
as a stranger to my heart and me, / Hold thee from this for ever. The barbarous 
Scythian, / Or he that makes his generation messes / To gorge his appetite, shall 
to my bosom / be as well neighbour’d, and reliev’d, / As though my sometime 
daughter” (1.1). The doors are shut, and the nature of politics in Lear is to 
make them remain so.
5. “Allow not Nature, more than Nature needs” (2.2)
In fi ne, such a sense was made possible by the widening of a gap separating 
a life of the animal from that of a human being. These two kinds of life were not 
identical because the economy of the former was premised on the idea of strict, 
sturdy, natural measure, whereas the order of the latter sprang from excess and 
superfl uity. As Lear puts it: “Allow not Nature, more than Nature needs: / Man’s 
life is cheap as beast’s” (2.2). There seem to be two “natures” then: one which 
is natural, no more than an answer to what Nature needs, a natural allowance 
granted life so that it could go on living. But nothing else and nothing more. 
The other “nature” is natural only to the degree to which it knows that it cannot 
remain within the confi nes of the “natural.” It is “more than Nature needs,” and 
the undefi ned more goes beyond “Nature” although this move itself is somehow 
natural. In the human being “Nature” both fulfi ls and defi es itself. Fulfi ls – because 
human life, like any other, wants to live itself as long as possible; defi es – because 
it can do so only when it crosses a certain point, an indelible but invisible line 
which separates the territory of nothing more from the realm of more than.... All 
human culture, Lear’s claim is no less than this, defi nes itself as an elaborate 
system of transcending the limitations of Nature. Culture is more than... The 
point is not only to protect oneself so as to sur-vive, but to single oneself out, 
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embellish oneself so that mere sur-viving would be translated into a complicated 
system of signs determining roles and positions one takes in a society. Sur-viving 
is principally democratic; culture is hierarchical and aristocratic. Hence Lear’s 
ironic but profound comment upon Regan’s elegant dress: “If only to go warm 
were gorgeous, / Why Nature needs not what thou gorgeous wears’t, / Which 
scarcely keeps thee warm, but for true need […]” (2.2). Culture off ers refuge 
against the wildness of the night. It does not mean culture precludes wildness; it 
means wildness in it is a part of more than... Thus, concealed behind pretences 
and masks, it is more dangerous and deadly. A gray zone of culture. The doors 
are shut, but wildness is not; it already rages indoors. 
6. “Why need one?” (2.2)
More than... of a culture is predicated upon a double game of prestige and thrifti-
ness. Both daughters operate on the principle of enhancing their power, of having 
more (politically, economically, and as Edmund’s physical attractiveness demon-
strates, also erotically). This, however, implies the necessity of imposing limits 
elsewhere. The growth of one’s own prestige is conditioned by the decrease of 
somebody else’s social standing. One’s own fi nancial prosperity necessitates cuts 
in everybody else’s. Hence Goneril’s questioning considering the number of her 
father’s entourage (“What need you fi ve and twenty? Ten? Or fi ve?” 2.2), which 
Regan summarizes in her curt calculation: “Why need one?” Everything depends 
upon the understanding of need. Another gray zone between sur-viving and living, 
scarcity and superfl uity. All human history in its social and political implications 
is negotiating this murky, stormy, and gray territory of fuzzy contours of need. 
7. “You think I’ll weep, / No, I’ll not weep. I have full cause of weeping” (2.2)
Lear’s refusal to weep amazes us. It seems that for someone like the old king, 
broken by the “fi lial ingratitude,” tears would be a natural relief. Certainly, there 
is a pressure of “the plague of custom” which prevents men from shedding tears. 
“Yet have the grace to consider that tears do not become man,” as Celia puts it 
bluntly in As You Like It (3.4). But, at the same time, Lear does not perceive the 
whole crisis exclusively terms of the parent-child relationship; he experiences it as 
a breaking-up of the whole system of legitimate authority which he has offi  cially 
ceded to his daughters. He has locked himself in a situation of disempowered 
authority that still wants to exercise the power which it has already delegated to 
somebody else. Goneril scores the point when she describes her father as “the 
idle old man / That still would manage those authorities / That he hath given 
away” (1.3). Lear is not like Richard II whose crown is being taken away from 
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him by force and hence the loss of the crown is a source of gray sadness of tears 
(Bataille: “There is something gray in tears […]”) (Fioretos 42):
Now is this golden crown like a deep well 
That owes two buckets, fi lling one another, 
The emptier ever dancing in the air, 
The other down, unseen and full of water: 
That bucket down and full of tears am I, 
Drinking my griefs, whilst you mount up on high. (Richard II, 4.1)
8. “[…]but I am bound / Upon a wheel of fi re, that mine own tears / Do scald, 
like molten lead” (4.7)
When Lear begins to weep, it is too late. As he puts it himself, he is already in 
the grave (“You do me wrong to take me out out o’ th’ grave,” 4.7), and the tears 
accompany this strange resurrection of a man who has been brutally punished 
for not having recognized the falsity of signals which put a course of events on 
a wrong track. Lear has misread pronouncements of Regan and Goneril which 
lack of insightfulness has soon imposed upon history a dark and sombre sublimity 
of a devastating civil war and banishment. Lear, like a latter day Ixion, is fi xed 
to a winged burning wheel (“bound / Upon a wheel of fi re”), and we should not 
ignore this mute mythological reference. First, because it connects with one of 
the most important themes of Lear – that of hospitality and readiness to welcome 
what comes to us uninvited and unexpected. Not being able to deal with this issue 
at length here, let us only quickly suggest a reading of Shakespeare’s tragedy as 
a sinuous story (similar to that of the mythological Ixion, a master violator of the 
host-guest relation) of the betrayal of the principle of unconditioned hospitality. 
The old king does not hospitably receive Cordelia’s “nothing” and, in consequence, 
excludes his own daughter from his household (“I disclaim all my paternal care,” 
1.1). A strange blindness and deafness which can be so powerful as to break the 
most intimate connection of familial lineage. Very soon Regan and Goneril will 
repeal the law of hospitality towards their father, and the most striking violation 
of this law will come from the hands of Regan and Cornwall who cruelly blind 
Gloucester whose welcome they have just embraced. Gloucester’s despaired “You 
are my guests: do me no foul play, friends” (3.7) marks a complete dismantling 
of hospitality as a ruling principle of sociability. 
Second, the element of monstrosity connects Lear and Ixion. When the 
raging king puts forth his anthropology which sees man as possessed by lust 
and self-interest, he makes reference to centaurs. “Down from the waist they are 
Centaurs, though women all above” (4.6). And we have to remember that it is 
the uncontrollable lust of Ixion that gave birth to the race of Ixionidae, otherwise 
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known as centaurs, a lineage which can be traced back to Ixion’s sexual act with 
a false-Hera conceived for him by the jealous Zeus (marginally we can notice 
that in Barthes the satyr says “I want my desire to be satisfi ed immediately. If 
I see a sleeping face, parted lips, an open hand, I want to be able to hurl myself 
upon them” (Barthes 155). We should never lose from our view this apparitional 
presence of the monstrous, of the uncanny, indelibly making its marks within us, 
which haunts Lear.
Third, in the Greek myth Ixion is bound, on Zeus’s order, to a fi ery wheel 
by Hermes, not only a messenger god but also the patron of hermeneutics. Ixion 
is punished for not having understood the ineradicable divine script of hospitality 
and so is Lear, strikingly blind both to the verbose but deceitful messages of the 
two elder daughters and to the truthful but monosyllabic proclamation of Cordelia. 
In the early scenes of the play Lear does not weep because it seems to him that 
he sees things clearly. He does not. He regains his sight only when tears begin to 
blur and veil his eyes. They are like “molten lead” because (1) they burn out the 
scales which prevented him from seeing and (2) they “scald” him, that is break 
the protective, immunitarian shell of self-righteousness opening his body to all 
kinds of wounds. Only now is he able to see that he is “cut to the brain” (3.6). 
Which means that only now, on condition of his eyes being veiled by tears, can 
he interrupt a circle of illusions. “Tears and not sight are the essence of the eye” 
and hence “deep down, deep down inside, the eye would be destined not to see 
but to weep” (Derrida 126). Lear’s tears resemble clouds, gray like ashes, which 
densely cover the sky above the moors but thus help Lear to begin to see his 
predicament which he was unable to see in the daytime sunshine.
9. “[…] I want this glib and oily art, / To speak and purpose not” (1.1)
Tears are paradoxical blockages which allow the, so far immobile, rays of eyesight 
to move. They also activate seeing as understanding. Only when blinded by tears, 
those liquid pearls, is the old king able to understand a true sense of everything 
which has been so ostentatiously proclaimed at the very beginning: now he sees 
the emptiness of rhetorical fl amboyance and the fullness of Cordelia’s nothing. 
From some-thing to no-thing is a movement of understanding. Thus weeping is 
also a critique of language and its dangerously overinfl ated claims. Seeing as 
understanding meet in the gray zone where language falters and begins to stammer 
and wane in a distance. “The most precious tears […], fl uid discharges more 
valuable than amber yet weighing less than air, are those that prevent a person 
from speaking – are tokens of lament only to the extent that they render language 
impossible without therefore replacing it […]. In gray areas […] language seems 
to exist only during the period when it appears between the tear’s delay […] and 
arrival” (Fioretos 46‒47). From the “oily art” of speaking, to the unnamed rest 
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which always belongs to silence is the course we cover in Lear. In the gray zone 
in which the king fi nds himself together with Edgar, Kent, and Gloucester, the 
social roles and words which name them do not vanish but undergo a radical 
deconstruction. We witness a ruthless mechanism of grayness which withers 
from inside the colours of the social structure. Hence, Lear can insist on the 
unquestionable character of his royal dignity (“I am the King himself,” what is 
more – “every inch a King,” 3.6) and yet, when he ultimately sees (that is when 
he pierces the cocoon of his own misconceptions), he, weeping, de-constructs his 
model of the world. The spatial metaphor of the theatre remains but the aesthetic 
contents which fi ll this structure changes from tragedy to tragi-comedy, this pecu-
liar and striking mixture of tears and laughter. “When we are born, we cry that 
we are come / To this great stage of fools” (4.6), tears mark a tragedy but this 
tragedy is performed by a group of “fools.” The canonical high form of monarchs, 
tragedy, is supplanted by a low form of the mob – comedy. One of Goneril’s last 
interventions when she sees her plot disintegrate and hopes thwarted is a brief 
statement: “An interlude” (5.3). Nothing could be more adequate to express this 
fold of history which is always present underneath its smooth surface. Tragi-comic 
may well be an aesthetic term which names what on the ground of philosophy 
was called “Fortune.” Kings replaced by fools, or – to be more specifi c – kings 
as fools, fools as the unnamed rest of kings which must be revealed if the king is 
to defend his humanity rather his function. This also spells the end of rhetorical 
brilliance as a mark of the political power and its effi  ciency. Now, a weeping 
Lear, also withdraws from the articulate language. His famous invective against 
man dwindles into the gray delta of helpless exclamations: “There’s hell, there’s 
darkness, there’s sulphurous pit; burning, scalding, stench, consumption: “fi e, fi e; 
pah, pah […]” (4.6).”Fie, fi e; pah, pah […]” inarticulate, ejaculative, stuttering 
of someone who, like Lear, notices that although his social role imposed upon 
him a discourse of the plural “we,” he does not know who are the “we” in whose 
name he was making his proclamations. “The stuttering itself betrays the form of 
the problem: we, ‘we,’ how are we to say ‘we’” (Nancy 70).
The fool, so frequently invoked in Lear and other Shakespeare’s plays, is 
a king of tears and laughter; he is the one who can subvert the structure of the 
imposed order and welcome the gray unknown which the orderly world does 
everything to prevent us from doing. Perhaps we should pay more attention to 
the Athenian craftsmen who in A Midsummer Night’s Dream change tragedy into 
tragi-comedy and thus disclose the erratic and illusory nature of the monarchical 
power which can force its decisions upon us only as long as (is it not also a lesson 
of The Tempest?) it exercises control over the elaborate and sophisticated invis-
ible means of evoking terror and obedience. What is at stake is again the issue 
of the “shut gates,” of the exaggerated immunizing system, which tears weaken 
and undermine thus making it possible for us to encounter what comes from the 
outside. “I do not think it would be diffi  cult to demonstrate that both tears and 
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laughter are connected with the invasion of the unknown, with the suppression 
of the part of the world we consider as known […]” (Fioretos 42). 
10. “He calls to horse, but I will not know whither” (2.2)
The old king sets out with his riders, but we have to notice that now, once he 
has been locked in the gray space, he is no more than a king-errant. The region 
of storm and hail does not recognize human political powers and makes the 
orderliness of the political world ridiculously empty. Lear commands, but his 
orders are dis-orderly, his directions mis-directed, and his timing is wrong. He 
orders his companions (“a desperate train” Regan will call them) to move, but 
it is a wild ride without a destination. He is on the verge of carrying out acts he 
cannot name or envisage (“I will do such things, / What they are yet, I know not”). 
The circumstances of the expedition are far from auspicious – “the night comes 
on, and the high winds / Do sorely ruffl  e, for many miles about / There’s scarce 
a bush.” Travelling under gray skies is not easy; “we linger and loiter, drift on or 
about, getting absolutely nowhere. As we watch the ashes of our faltering exist-
ence grayen, we try to make amends by choosing some mots justes to sum it all 
up, but sooner rather than later we feel racked, throw up our hands and indulge 
again the simplest of desires known to us: that to disappear” (Fioretos 115). Lear 
wants to vanish, dissolve in the storm, in what he calls “winds, cataracts, hurri-
canoe spout, sulphurous and thought-executing fi res” (3.2). Politics of grayness 
must end up in madness of a storm which rages not only outside but, fi rst of all, 
inside man’s soul – “The tempest in my mind, / Doth from my senses take all 
feeling else” (3.4). Lear appears on stage proclaiming his “darker purpose,” but 
now, when is himself is a subject in the domain of the gray zone, he has to move 
within the range of gray purposes, purposes unclear, unknown, chaotic, which 
are no purposes at all. And since a society cannot be managed without a set of 
purposes, objectives, and rules, then Lear is stripped of company. His knights 
disperse, his mind begins to veer from the course of sanity. When we see him 
next, he is alone accompanied only by Fool. “But who’s with him?” asks Kent, to 
which in the gray zone there is only possible answer – “None but the fool” (3.1).
11. “Meantime we shall express our darker purpose” (1.1)
These are words with which Lear makes his appearance on stage. These are also 
words which delineate a certain physics and hermeneutics of royalty. Physics, 
because they evidently, through the very choice of rhetoric (the royal “we”) suggest 
a “heaviness” of the kingly spirit which has always to deal with and speak in the 
plural. In its own name but also in the name of the body politic. The weight of 
20 Tadeusz Sławek
the plural, nominated in such words as cares, business, and ultimately burden, 
dictates its laws in the world of politics. Darker purpose ushers in a diff erent 
question, that of the principally unclear character of the political realm. It is 
true that the monarch is to publicly announce his decision but, at the same time, 
the royal pronouncement presents itself as something which, so far hidden and 
invisible, is come to the open, and yet does not completely shake off  the cloak 
of ambiguity. The purpose is to be proclaimed, but it is still a darker purpose 
which, in turn, invites a suspicion that the political is a domain of goals and tactics 
which, even when disclosed, keep in themselves a sealed, darker chamber. Never 
THE purpose, one and totally and lawfully revealed, but always a possibility of 
a sequence of aims, each of which may carry in itself its darker twin brother. 
Thus the political would call for a hermeneutics able to deal with these sequences 
allowing, at least, temporarily, to defi ne and map positions of a given purpose as, 
provisionally, deprived of its curtain of darker purposes. 
Shakespeare provides us with a plebeian version of such hermeneutics in 
A Midsummer Night’s Dream where Bottom, newly brought back to his human 
form, tries to come to terms with his previous adventures. Their meaning will 
remain for ever veiled and unapproachable, although approached it must be. 
“Methought I was – there is no man can tell what […]. The eye of man hath not 
heard, the ear of man hath not seen; man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue 
to conceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was. I will get Peter Quince 
to write a ballad of this dream: it shall be called Bottom’s Dream, because it 
hath no bottom […]” (4.1). There is no bottom, no ultimate sense which blocks 
all further movements because there is no Bottom, there is no one who can, after 
all the sinuous transformations, fully answer to this name. All there exists is 
a metamorphic current which rapidly carries us where it wants.
12. “Give me the map there” (1.1)
Decades ago Marshall McLuhan considered this command pivotal as a signa-
ture of a new era which “provided a model of the process of quantifi cation and 
fragmentation as it entered the world pf politics and family life” (159). The map 
facilitates ways of commanding reality by translating huge territories and expanses 
into a manageable and serviceable chunks of pictorial spaces. To divide a kingdom 
while yielding a map is easy. And yet King Lear is a play on how deceptive this 
process of the translation of the unmanageable into manageable is. Everything 
that follows demonstrates that the neat outlines of the map do not correspond to 
the fuzziness of a geographic, political, and moral reality. The map and a quick 
movement of the king’s hand portioning out areas, giving them names, rules and 
thus new political dimensions, radically diff er from the consequences of such 
a manual gesture in the material world. McLuhan is right: “Shakespeare’s entire 
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work is taken up with the themes of the new delimitations of power, both kingly 
and private” (160), and hence the monarch’s order is to be read as an attempt to 
face the challenge of such delimitations. One needs to supplant McLuhan’s percep-
tive observation with one more crucial element in play: everything that will take 
place on the map, the movement of the king’s pencil demarcating new borders 
and its dramatic consequences, will depend on language. To be more precise: on 
a discourse and the ability to determine conditions in which a discourse makes 
sense. Thus, it needs to be coupled with the last two words of Lear’s monologue: 
speak fi rst. Before we proceed, let us remember Bottom’s warning: Methought 
I was – there is no man can tell what. Its echoes resound in Lear’s interrogation 
“who is it that can tell me who I am?” (1.4). It is only when the self begins to see 
itself as problematic losing its former self-assurance that a path towards a commu-
nity is possible. “The Other is thinkable, and must be thought, beginning from 
that moment when the self appears and appears to itself as a ‘self’” (Nancy 77).
13. “We have divided / In three our Kingdom” (1.1)
The act of dividing is of singular importance. It refers not only to a demarcation 
of new, separate administrative units; it stems from a certain vision of human 
community and indicates a certain line of political thinking. Lear means his deci-
sion to lead to what Kant called later the “eternal peace.” The king steps down so 
“that future strife / May be prevented now” (1.1). Hence a question: can peace be 
secured and successfully preserved by the act of division? Does not peace belong 
the realm of unity? Is it not a way of dressing the wound of division? A hundred 
years after Shakespeare, Anthony Shaftesbury will speak of the merits and draw-
backs of what he calls “cantonizing,” on the one hand, a “natural” activity when 
the state is too vast, too imposing, and therefore “unnatural,” on the other hand 
however, an operation which may threaten what he calls “the associating genius 
of man” by dispersing people and directing them towards their own interests, 
which he considers the very opposite of “sociableness” (76).
And divisions do proliferate in Lear. First, the old king divides the kingdom, 
then estranges Cordelia from himself and her two sisters; very soon Regan and 
Goneril will turn against Lear and then begin to secretly scheme against each other. 
Finally a war will descend upon the already divided and antagonistic territories. 
Albany’s speech grasps well the intricate knot of confl icts: “Where I could not 
be honest / I never yet was valiant, for this business / It touches us, as France 
invades our land, / Not bolds the King, with others whom I fear, / Most just and 
heavy causes make oppose” (5.1). If there is a way of thinking peace in political 
terms as the most precious gift of human fellowship, it must see it as a gradation 
of confl icts. Anthony Shaftesbury touched upon this problem in his Characteristics: 
“‘Tis strange to imagine that war, which of all things appear the most savage, 
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should be the passion of the most heroic spirits. But ‘tis in war that the knot of 
fellowship is closest drawn” (75). Albany recognizes the rightness of Lear’s cause, 
he admits the old king has a moral right to “oppose” and contest the ruling power, 
and yet he suspends this right on behalf of what he considers a more serious and 
immediate challenge – a foreign invasion. A thin and vague prospect of peace 
depends upon the proper arrangement of a sequence of feuds and contentions. 
The ending of the play suggests yet another path: peace is practicable as a time of 
mourning after the excesses of history after which, as Albany says, “our present 
business / Is general woe” (5.3). More metaphorically, Edgar will describe peace 
as “the weight of this sad time” (5.3) thus connecting peace with a rich and sombre 
realm of melancholia. Peace is a melancholy of history, a time when a Realpolitik 
of self-interest gives way to a politics of sentiment and sensitiveness. A time, 
Edgar confi des, when we “Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say” (5.3). 
14. “[…] With reservation of an hundred knights […]” (1.1)
Niccolò Machiavelli indirectly speaks against the map when he accentuates the 
necessity to actually know a given territory, since a map constitutes an unreal, 
illusory habitat which diff ers considerably from a physical landscape. He warns in 
the 14th chapter of The Prince: “he [ the prince – T.S.] must continually engage in 
hunting, and thus accustom his body to hardships; and meanwhile learn the nature 
of the land, how steep the mountains are, how the valleys debouch, where the 
plains lie, and understand the nature of rivers and swamps” (90). In her reproach 
of her father’s train of knights Goneril speaks as a keen reader of Machiavelli’s 
treatise: she perceives Lear’s armed group as being on a constant alert, prac-
ticing their military skills and thus, always ready to act, as an independent force 
of mercenaries, against the decrees of the state: “Tis politic, and safe to let him 
keep / At point a hundred knights: yes, that on every dream, / Each buzz, each 
fancy, each complaint, dislike / He may enguard his dotage with their powers, / 
And hold our lives in mercy” (1.4). 
15. “To shake all cares and business from our age, / Conferring them on younger 
strengths, while we / Unburthen’d crawl toward death” (1.1)
The strategy looks simple: divide the empire, get rid of the stress of reigning, and 
thus live freely. This amplifi es a general thesis of the burdensome character of 
political power which calls for much energy and strength and therefore must, at 
some point, be recognized as being beyond the ruler’s abilities. There must come 
a point past which power is nothing but a burden, a weight no longer bearable, 
and the task of the prince is to be able to mark up such a point, so as not to go 
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beyond it. But abandoning power is more complicated; it is a decision from the 
inside deconstructed by its own opposition, a decision ultimately un-decisive. 
Lear himself provides us with two arguments on behalf of this thesis. First, if 
what remains after the time of power is crawl toward death, then reigning is the 
epitome of life. To live is to strive for power, practice power and maintain it. 
To exercise power is a synonym of living. The very idea of giving up political 
authority has then a very diff erent lining: a prince has to give it up in such a way 
so as to be able to live and thus to, somehow, remain in power. This may very 
well be a darker purpose of all politics.
The other argument follows shortly: Lear’s opening speech which is to 
proclaim his stepping down begins and fi nishes with a command, which is a mani-
festation of force. Hence a question: since power belongs to the old, even if they 
seemingly want to abandon it, is it possible at all for the world to be ever ruled 
by young ones? And another one: is politics conceivable outside the rhetoric and 
logic of command and enforcing obedience?
16. “[…] while we / Unburthen’d crawl toward death” (1.1)
First of all, never unburthen’d since the stigma of power remains indelible. Goneril 
sees it clearly that political power somehow “grows into” the ruler’s body, soaks 
into him or her, becomes indistinguishable from his/her substance. The burden of 
decision making cannot be simply put aside. “[…] idle old man / That still would 
manage those authorities / That he hath given away […]” (1.3). The old man is 
called idle which predicates his being useless and vain but, at the same time, it 
suggests – through the Greek etymology taking us back to itharos meaning “clear as 
in spring” – that Goneril discovers the truth about man in general. When transparent 
and thus open to the insightful investigative look, man reveals himself/herself for 
what he/she truly is: a being of power because power constitutes a mark which 
cannot be washed away and removed. Power is an irremovable, deep-seated tattoo 
over the existential structure of man. The body is always politic and therefore it 
is always a tattooed body; fl esh covered with more or less decipherable marks 
(see Coriolanus) of honour and authority. Thus, we “crawl toward death” – this 
part of Lear’s proclamation is true; but never unburthen’d. This grace has been 
withdrawn from us, mortals.
17. “[…] while we […] crawl toward death” (1.1)
We may set Lear’s opening speech next to Prospero’s concluding lines. The magus 
of the enchanted island, having claimed back his dukedom, wants to retire. Back in 
Naples he hopes “to see the nuptial / Of these our dear-belov’d solemnized” (5.1) 
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and then “retire me to my Milan, where / Every third thought shall be my grave.” 
In both dramas the same positioning of parties: the old versus the young, a spring 
of marriage versus a winter of cold senility, nuptials versus mournful obsequies, 
retirement of old rulers versus the enthronement of new ones. Prospero and Lear 
both crawl toward death and neither of them is truly unburthen’d. The former 
got rid of his books of wisdom and became helpless, besides he will never be 
able to forget the naivete of the young. Miranda’s memorable and fatuous outcry 
of admiration “O, wonder! / How many goodly creatures are there here! / How 
beauteous mankind is! O brave new world / That hath such people in’t!” (5.1) is 
a clear indication that the rule of the young in Naples will not be very successful. 
Lear has yet to learn this lesson, but his education in this respect will be thor-
ough and painful. He ends up cursing humanity a “men of stone” (5.3) worthy 
of a plague. “A plague upon you murderers, traitors all” (5.3) is a harangue that 
belongs to the pages of Machiavelli’s treatise in which the foundational belief of 
the political anthropology is a radically realistic estimate of not so much “human 
nature,” as of the forms which we have created for humanity to act and live in: 
“[…] for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who 
abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about 
his own ruin than his preservation” (92).
“Crawling toward death” remains the only territory in which the deadly 
distinction between “is done” and “ought to be done” does not hold. This is where 
we are who we are. The only diff erence between the old and the young seems to 
be that the latter consider it only as a distant hypothesis while the former have 
experienced that the very essence of “how we live” is how we “crawl toward 
death.” This knowledge does not make the old any “better”: it imposes upon 
their faces a peculiar grimace, a grin, or sends through their bodies a spasm of 
a strange laughter. As Prospero says “And my ending is despair” (5.1) Despair: 
the unbridgeable gap between the “is” and “ought” which also is a source of the 
tragi-comic.
18. “[…] while we […] crawl […]” (1.1)
The choice of the verb should not go unnoticed. It indicates that despair also 
implies a change in the way in which we position ourselves in the world: no longer 
walking but, instead, crawling. Certainly a redefi nition of the place of man is in 
view. In fi ne, the verb marks a move away from humanity towards animality. If 
being human tended and worked upon a distance separating it from the animal and 
its dark, earthly domain of soil, now crawl jettisons us from this erect position. 
First, it slows the pace of our dealing with the world, the ever growing velocity 
of which we have always been proud of. Despite nascent criticism, like Goethe’s 
concept of Luziferisch marrying rapidity of changes with the diabolical element, 
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what we have interpreted as “progress” was synonymous with the increasing 
ability to move faster and faster. A shift to crawling deals a heavy blow to these 
ambitions. As if Lear were saying: I know that my former frantic running along 
the course of life was, in fact, doomed to end up in crawling, was nothing but 
crawling temporarily suspended and disguised, and now it is time to recognize it 
for what it has always been. Politics is a clever and manifold succession of masks 
imposed upon a dull face of boredom. 
And second, crawling inevitably puts us closer to the ground, face down, 
with legs and arms translated into animal paws, and the proud erect position all 
of a sudden crushed by a sight of the danger we have always known to be there 
and always indulged in a rich variety of evasive moves which were to make it 
possible for us to ignore this jeopardy. Now, we crawl like soldiers, no longer 
on parade but under a deadly fi re, powerless in the trenches of fear and anxiety. 
Lear says and Prospero confi rms: we are animals, and we are exposed. We are 
brought into the Open, no longer able to hide behind elaborate constructions of 
power (which, however, we can never abandon or destroy), and now we see that 
“the understanding of the human world is possible only through the experience of 
the closest proximity – even if deceptive – to this exposure without disconceal-
ment” (Agamben 62). 
19. “The tyranny of the open night” (3.3)
 We have to begin by drawing a line beyond which we cannot go when thinking 
of the Open. This line determines the fi eld of operation of such human categories 
as “friendliness,” “magnanimity,” or “benevolence.” Indiff erent to human concerns 
and predicaments, the Open demarcates a sphere where politics is stripped of 
its embellishments and is revealed for what it is – operations of brute force and 
violence. One has to notice right away that in Lear relations between politics 
and nature are complicated. Violent oppression refuses to be qualifi ed simply as 
endemic to the confi nes of “Nature;” Realpolitik of power exceeds these confi nes. 
The tyranny in question is “too rough for Nature to endure.” To understand this 
strange, cruel excess of power, we have to turn to Edmund’s speech in which he 
chooses and evokes “Nature” as his patroness. “Thou Nature art my Goddess” 
(1.2), confesses Edmund, but his proclamation in fact reduces Nature to the 
scale of humanity and human organization of the world in which the concept of 
“Nature” has its own un-natural, because man-made, place. Edmund calls forth 
“Nature” only to struggle with what he understands as “the plague of custom.” 
Himself a bastard, Edmund wishes to abolish the hierarchy in which “bastards” 
occupy a disadvantaged position. His rebellion is not on behalf of the non-human 
or a-human but super-human. His point of destination is not the unchartered Open 
but a well-mapped territory of human property. Edmund declares war not against 
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the human law which disfi gures and frequently destroys the world and relations 
within it; his war aims at bending the law to his own advantage. To “grow” and 
“prosper” is his purpose and hence his declaration: “Legitimate Edgar, I must 
have your land” (1.2). Edmund uses “Nature” not to re-defi ne the human order 
but to strengthen the sphere of human, all-too-human interests. Now we see why 
the tyranny of the Open (night) is “too rough” for “Nature:” it is so because 
“Nature” has already been incorporated by man in his mental order and thus has 
become yet another category of the human discourse organizing the world. To 
experience the Open must therefore imply going beyond the confi nes of these 
categories. Hence, the madness of the young Ophelia and the old Lear. Both of 
them gave up on the articulate language, both have traded it for plants, both crawl 
rather than walk (Ophelia ultimately will join fl uvial creatures for which water is 
the native element). Cordelia: “[…] why, he was met even now / As mad as the 
vex’d sea, singing aloud, / Crwon’d with rank fumiter and furrow-weeds, / With 
bur-docks, hemlock, nettles, cuckoo-fl owers, / Darnel, and all the idle weeds that 
grow / In our sustaining corn” (4.4).
20. “[…] the idle weeds that grow/ In our sustaining corn” (4.4)
The Open (night) which is always “too rough” does violence to our principal, 
foundational notions such as tender cultivation from which rises “our sustaining.” 
Weeds are “idle,” that is unproductive, if not counterproductive, in the whole 
scheme of man’s idea of cultivation. To make one step further: they are, as both 
“weeds” and “idle,” adversaries of cultura, the elaborate system which humanity 
fi nds defi ning and originary. Vico notes it carefully and repetitively in his exten-
sive commentaries to the frontispiece of The New Science: “The plough rests 
its handle against the altar with a certain majesty, to give us to understand that 
ploughed lands were the fi rst altars of the gentiles, and to denote also the natural 
superiority which the heroes believed they had over their socii” (10), and hence 
“cities were called arae, altars, throughout the ancient world of the gentiles” (11).
Lear, bedecked with weeds, is a fi gure which gives shelter to what has been 
marginalized and condemned as useless if not destructive. In this way he opposes 
Edmund whose logic aims at refashioning the order in such a way so that its 
canonical rules (such as the law of private property) would support the irregu-
larly infl ated ambitions. Weeds gather at Lear’s body as if it were an “altar,” in 
the same way as, Vico again,” to these altars, the impious-nomadic weak, fl eeing 
for their lives from the stronger, came seeking refuge, and the pious strong […] 
took the weak under their protection” (12). We read this scene looking for two 
senses: fi rst is that of the idea of shelter which man must give to the unproductive 
and marginalized in order to face the Open; second, that the act of giving refuge 
takes place at the margins of the order, in the realm of disease and insanity (which 
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Cordelia in the same scene asks the physician to cure), and is itself a strange 
movement, an activity in itself unproductive and yet containing many possibilities. 
This is a reading of the Open off ered by Agamben’s interpretation of 
Heidegger’s notion of Brachliegen which means “to leave fallow, that is, inactive, 
uncultivated.” But it is precisely this deactivation which is viewed as “potenti-
ality for doing” (66). Cordelia sees the motivation for her military commitment 
enhanced by the strange irrational activity of the old, deranged Lear. Her decision 
is to struggle not because of “blown ambition” but for “love, dear love, and our 
ag’ed father’s right” (4.4). This is what politics of the gray zone is based upon, 
and this is also why it is bound to lose. It must “lose” because thinking of and 
doing justice to the beloved, it knows that this justice can never include others 
who also deserve it. “There is something inside love – its enclosure in a world 
of duality – that essentially contradicts justice. Not because love is too pure, but 
rather […] because it is not pure enough to satisfy the general demand for the 
good that only justice can provide” (Esposito 123). 
21. “The Gods are just” (5.3)
Justice is long overdue. It comes when nearly everything has been done in an 
unjust manner. Death has spread its shroud upon Cordelia, Lear, and Gloucester; 
the civil war has ravaged and “gor’d” the state. Human justice which tries to 
restore order at the end of the drama consists mainly in shedding blood: Edgar 
kills Edmund, Lear stabs the Captain who hanged Cordelia, Regan and Goneril 
successfully and fatally plot against each other. Justice seems to be no more 
than a system of equivalents holding over the dark area of crimes. And the 
divine justice is not diff erent. The Gods are just, claims Edgar, only after they 
have previously set up a deadly trap for a human being. Justice is a follow up to 
injustice, it remedies what it has itself spoiled before. Gloucester’s suff ering is 
a long-overdue punishment for the sin of his youth. “The Gods are just, and of 
our pleasant vices / Make instruments to plaque us: / The dark and vicious place 
where thee he got, / Cost him his eyes” (5.3). What gods do to earn the title of 
being just is to penalize man for the illegitimate use of the faculties they have 
themselves provided him with. Sacred justice is a virtue which serves interests 
of gods themselves rather than straightening ways of humanity. This is the heart 
of Gloucester’s bitter comment: “As fl ies to wanton boys, are we to th’ Gods, / 
They kill us for their sport” (4.1). Gods and men both share the unruly sphere 
of desire and passion (wantonness). Inside the human realm justice is then no 
more than a game of self-interests coordinated and managed by power. Goneril’s 
impudent challenge “the Laws are mine not thine/ Who can arraign me for’t?” 
(5.3) is a great example of this regularity. Divine justice ministered by gods to the 
human world is a game of pleasure the source of which is the painfully prolonged 
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time which lapses between a sin and its criminalization and a sinuously tortured 
sequence of events which make it impossible to see a connection between the 
fault and its corrective measure. As Gloucester says divine justice is no more than 
gods’ sport. “This is also why justice is always the need for justice, that is, the 
objection to and protest against injustice, the call that cries for justice, the breath 
that exhausts itself in calling for it” (Nancy 189).
22. “I’ll fetch some fl ax and whites of eggs / To apply to his bleeding face” (3.7)
Perhaps we should correct ourselves: not lose but act in such a way that the standard 
logic of winning or losing traditionally dominating politics does not pertain to 
these actions. When Cornwall and Regan brutalize Gloucester (Cornwall: “Upon 
these eyes of thine, I’ll set my foot,” 3.7), servants are the only ones to react. The 
call of the rebellion is the same as Kent’s plea to Lear: to withhold action so as 
to open a space for deliberation. Kent begins with the admonition that power has 
to safeguard itself against the linguistic zest (“When power to fl attery bows?” 
1.1), and then moves towards a criticism of hasty judgment which should end up 
in repealing previous decisions and reopen the process of deliberation: “reserve 
thy state, / And in thy best consideration check / This hideous rashness” (1.1). 
The servant’s plea to Cornwall: “Hold your hand, my Lord” (3.7) belongs to the 
same order of attempts to struggle with the anomie resulting from constructing 
human society on the basis of property and propriety, those two foundations of 
the hierarchical order. Both Kent and the servant appeal to the superiors not on 
behalf of the well-established, structured social roles but on behalf of the loyalty 
of emotionally human, not social, response. This can be seen in servant’s address: 
“I have serv’d you ever since I was a child: / But better service have I never done 
you, / Than now to bid you hold” (3.7). Regan, a politician speaking from within 
rigours of her craft, understands it not as a call for opening a space for a common 
deliberation, but in a way characteristic of political thinking, as a revolutionary 
gesture which wants to abolish the dominating order. Her “A peasant stand up 
thus?” coupled with a treacherous attack on the servant from behind is a clear 
reaction of a threatened guardian of the hierarchical social order. Two conclusions 
follow from this scene. First, there is a possibility of actions which would not 
be energized exclusively by the obtaining social order of anomie, action based 
upon the loyalties much more fundamental and profound than those generated by 
the theatre of social roles. Second, such actions sooner or later will bring about 
political commitment which will have to begin by unbolting the doors (Third 
Servant: “Let’s follow the old Earl, and get the Bedlam / To lead him where he 
would […],” 3.7) and replace the politics of wounding with that which dresses 
and tries to heal wounds. Hence, “Go thou: I’ll fetch some fl ax and whites of 
eggs / To apply to his bleeding face” (3.7). Such politics moves beyond mere 
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success or failure, and its obligations do not derive from party loyalties. In his 
fi nal words Edgar formulates succinctly the premise of such politics, which we 
may describe as “gray”: “Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say” (5.3).
23. “Nothing, my Lord” (1.1)
What the servants do in the scene where Cornwall tears out Gloucester’s eyes is 
precisely not making from the shaft, not running away from the sword raised to 
strike a deadly blow. This is also Kent’s attitude – the old councillor is ready to 
allow the shaft to hit the target (“Let it fall rather, though the fork invade / The 
region of my heart,” 1.1), and this middle position between the sword and its 
prey, the bow and the bull’s eye, interests us here. It designates a space in which 
a diff erent politics is conceivable; a Realpolitik in which the body is totally 
subjected to political ambitions and tactics momentarily makes room for the 
body liberated from such pressures, the body de-politicized. Realpolitik which is 
biopolitics, that is a politics in which the body matters only as a token in a ruthless 
game of power is for a brief moment illuminated by the light of a politics in which 
life matters for what it is, a sudden spark of a politics of bios, of politics as bios. 
Cordelia’s famous nothing, puncturing the excessive accumulation of rhetorical 
and material goods produced by Goneril and Regan and accepted at its face value 
by Lear, is another fl ash of the short circuit of this type. What Cordelia does in 
her nothing is defend the nakedness of the thing and life against the “double 
pomp” of Realpolitik which always hides its naked interests behind masks and 
pretences. Cordelia’s nothing demonstrates the wastefulness of politics by trying 
to reveal the fact that politics, always and inevitably a domain of some-thing, is 
human only to the degree to which it preserves and shelters its connection with 
the no-thing of existence in which each individual is grounded. Hence, we cannot 
but endorse Roberto Esposito’s view that “if we fail to grasp this constitutive and 
imperative link between thing and nothing, which melancholy at once undergoes 
and safeguards, we risk being stuck with a reductive and simplifi ed image of 
community” (29). We sense a similar warning against the obsessive accumulation 
of the some-thing and the way they impose false embellishment upon politics in 
Salisbury’s speech in Shakespeare’s King John:
Therefore, to be possess’d with double pomp, 
To guard a title that was rich before, 
To gild refi ned gold, to paint the lily, 
To throw a perfume on the violet, 
To smooth the ice, or add another hue 
Unto the rainbow, or with taper-light 
To seek the beauteous eye of heaven to garnish, 
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess. (4.1) 
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24. “[…] Nor are those empty-hearted, whose low sounds / Reverb 
no hollowness” (1.1)
Kent is trying to bare Lear’s folly (“when Lear is mad […],” 1.1) which seems 
to consist in the excessive faith in words. A danger innate to language, a threat 
which hovers in every utterance, is that a sophisticated construction of many 
sentences and rhetorical tropes is never loved in. The hollowness in question is 
an echo which resounds in empty, though elaborately ornamented, spaces. Hence 
to the contortions of Goneril and Regan’s syntax Cordelia opposes not a sentence 
but only one word. Her nothing is a solitary, maverick gunslinger on a mission 
to reveal the abuses and dark machinations of power manifest in discourse. 
Nothing illustrates these cunning stratagems better that Goneril’s fl orid speech 
which seemingly shows inadequacy of language to express love (“Sir, I love you 
more than word can wield the matter,” 1.1), while, in fact, it glorifi es speech as 
a way to obtain one’s will. Cordelia’s nothing cuts an opening in the ornate, but 
hollow, shell of discourse, pointing at an exit from the subterfuge. Such cutting, 
a bad wound dealt to the fl uency and verbosity of discourse cannot be carried 
out by a sentence which is always suspected of hiding traps of power. Hence, 
only one word, which being nothing, in a sense eliminates itself leaving us with 
no-thing, with empty hands of love against those who are empty-hearted in their 
claims to power and possessions. And we have to remember that the theme of 
the rhetorical exercises set by Lear is love, and their point is how to say I-love-
you. From this perspective, King Lear reinforces the strength of Roland Barthes’ 
argument which emphasizes the active character of such an amorous declaration 
whose force is directed against language. “Just as amen is at the limit of language, 
without collusion with its system, […] so the proff ering of love (I-love-you) stands 
at the limit of syntax, welcomes tautology (I-love-you means I-love-you), rejects 
the servility of the Sentence” (153). Competing with her verbose sisters Cordelia 
can answer only with one word.
25. “The bow is bent and drawn, make from the shaft” (1.1)
And we cannot let the (rain) bow go unnoticed. A deadly weapon, it is, at the 
same time, an opening which takes us beyond the limitations of the death-dealing 
order of Realpolitik. As Heraclitus remarked in his 48 fragment, the bow, bios, 
is a strange, unique fi gure in which life and death are twisted together. “For the 
bow (bios) the name is life (bios), but the work is death” (116). In a surprising 
passage from the fi nal section of his Tristes tropiques Claude Lévi-Strauss brings 
together two extraordinary arches which have always attracted human attention, 
two phenomena oddly married in the English language: the rainbow and the bow. 
We will comb this fragment looking for traces of principles upon which a political 
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action other than that characteristic of Realpolitik of self-interests and ambitions 
could be conceivable:
Man is not alone in the universe, any more than the individual is alone in the group, 
or any one society alone among other societies. Even if the rainbow of human 
cultures should go down for ever into the abyss which we are so insanely creating, 
there will still remain open to us provided we are alive and the world is in existence 
a precarious arch that points towards the inaccessible. (397) 
Lévi-Strauss begins by anthropological pessimism which seems to be the fi rst 
necessary step to make: one has to carefully measure the so called “successes” 
or “progress” of civilization seeing human history not only as a solid sequence 
of events but also as intervals, fi ssures, cracks which, normally ignored, in fact 
punctuate the texture of history. The sanity of action, step two, must be countered 
and moderated by the refl ection upon the “the abyss which we are so insanely 
creating.” Step three is a sally against the supposed centrality and uniqueness of 
the human being, the belief which has always energized Realpolitik conducted 
on behalf of my /our interests to the detriment of common weal and interests of 
others. A new kind of politics, that of nothing and of a stand we responsibly take 
between the bow and arrow, the sword and its victim, must look for its sources in 
the democracy of being which not only does not exclude other nations/peoples but 
includes ALL that IS. “Man is not alone in the universe,” is a synthetic formulation 
of such an attitude. The fourth step brings us to a recognition of heterogeneity 
as a principle virtue which must be rediscovered against forays of nationalisms. 
Here the fi rst bow makes its appearance: Lévi-Strauss speaks about “the rainbow 
of human cultures” rather than one, homogenous, single-coloured, monochromatic 
culture energized by what he in another place in his book calls “greed.” The fi fth 
step is most important as it directly brings us in the vicinity of Cordelia’s nothing. 
A path which can take us away from the cul-de-sac of Realpolitik is not that blazed 
by Machiavelli but that suggested humbly by Lear’s youngest and disinherited 
daughter. Despite the increasing madness of the sanity of Realpolitik (represented 
by Goneril, Regan, and in the early stages of the drama by Lear himself) with 
its duplicitous pitfalls, there is always an opening which rises up and bends in 
a form of another bow: “a precarious arch that points towards the inaccessible.” 
A beautiful and rich passage which we will not be able to do justice to in this brief 
attempt. Let us only say quickly that the “inaccessible” in question is what has to 
remain unnamed, a category beyond all categorization, which translates us outside 
the “hive-like labors” and as a kind of “grace” allows us to grasp what grounds 
us in life. As Strauss concludes, “On this opportunity, this chance of for once 
detaching oneself from the implacable process, life itself depends.” This is precisely 
what constitutes the signifi cance of Cordelia’s powerful nothing which thwarts 
all eff orts towards translation into a language of some-thing (to the blindness 
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of Lears’ famous response: “Nothing will come of nothing,” (1.1), we should 
oppose the insightfulness of “every-thing will come of nothing”). 
We discover the same energy in the servant’s standing up against his master. 
His claim “I have serv’d you ever since I was child: / But better service have 
I never done you, / Than now to bid you hold” (3.7). Good human politics can be 
conducted only standing up against what its institutions and norms expect us to do. 
If Realpolitik always advocates and proclaims serviceability of subjects, human 
politics of the gray zone deconstructs this belief: only by radically questioning 
rigorous serviceability, can we be truly of service to a community.
26. “Give me some help! Oh cruel! Oh you Gods!” (3.7)
Barbara Skarga carefully emphasizes that only my sensitiveness to what goes 
beyond me, what transcends me, has a power and energy to wake me up from 
a slumber of a status quo in which I feel exempt from any desire to commit myself 
to anything that is not me. Thus, what is awaken is my sense of responsibility all 
of a sudden spurred by the voice of the other which has somehow chosen me as 
the addressee of its call (59). This is what happens when the encounter takes place. 
But we have to remember that the very scene we have borrowed our quotation 
from is a double encounter. One puts together Gloucester, Regan and Cornwall; 
the latter two will soon start torturing the old man in the name of their interests. 
The other encounter cuts through the fi rst: it is the servant intervening between 
the illegitimate rage of his master and its helpless victim. The intervention also 
tries to restore the law of hospitality violated by the two culprits. The servant 
wants to hold the hand of his master, so that no crime would foul the temple of 
a hospitable refuge. As Gloucester cries out: “You are my guests: do me no foul 
play, friends” (3.7). A whole series of slippages: fi rst, in the realm of Realpolitik 
being a guest does not preclude a “foul play.” This is a lesson of Machiavelli: 
who tries to demonstrate that good faith is laudable, but “the experience of 
our times shows those princes to have done great things who have had little 
regard for good faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse men’s brains, 
and who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their founda-
tion” (101). A second slippage: the only source of grace comes from a reversal 
of roles – a servant will turn out a true friend and host. Only servants, citizens 
of the second rank, if citizen at all (“slave” is the name given to the servant by 
Cornwall; “The slave was a thing with a role of a person […]” (Esposito 77). 
dwellers of the margins and peripheries, those addressed with derogatory animal 
references (Regan to the servant – “How now, you dog,” 3.7). Only from this 
gray zone whose inhabitants do not hesitate to question the established order not 
on behalf of their interests but in the name of coming to somebody’s rescue, only 
from there can come the answer to the call “Give me some help.”
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27. “Hold your hand, my Lord” (3.7)
Here we touch upon a major transgression, if not a scandal which undermines the 
very foundation of a status quo of the state machinery founded upon the principle 
of the unrefl ective obedience to his master’s voice. Lear formulates this premise 
in his exchange with Gloucester: “And the creature run from the cur: there thou 
mightst behold the great image of authority, a dog’s obeye’d in offi  ce” (4.6). Under 
no circumstances is a servant permitted to question actions of the master, and 
the bid to “hold” is particularly duplicitous from the point of view of authority 
because it opens a space and time for in-activity from which there may emerge 
an argumentation or litigation demonstrating unlawfulness of the master’s voice. 
The monarch is a sovereign who is always right and always in the right, and his 
voice speaks with the authority of necessity. A sovereign does what is inevitable 
and necessary. Necessity is the domain of a sovereign, and this necessity is the 
only source of law. Regan and Cornwall do what is necessary in order to secure 
their political and material interests. As we have seen, they recognize that a “form 
of justice” would be welcome, but Realpolitik is constantly ready to suggest its 
own justice, always timely, always on time. Hence the state of exception which 
“as a fi gure of necessity […] appears as an ‘illegal’ but perfectly ‘juridical and 
constitutional’ measure that is realized in the production of new norms” (Agamben 
2005, 28). A wish to suspend an action is then a desire to suspend a whole system 
in which law is inevitably founded upon nothing else but some juridical decisions. 
The servant’s intervention demonstrates the vanity of such a position; it points 
out that law looks for its source in the cry for help that is outside the juridical 
mechanism as such. In other words, it punctures the myth of necessity as a basis 
for a political action. Again Lévi-Strauss will assist us in this critique of neces-
sity as a manifestation of grace, the only grace available to a human being. In 
the same fi nal fragment of Tristes tropiques we encounter the following apology 
of a “hold” or “halt”:
The grace to call a halt, that is to say: to check the impulse which prompts Man 
always to block up, one after another, such fi ssures as may be open in the blank wall 
of necessity and to round off  his achievement by slamming shut the doors of his own 
prison. This is the grace for which every society longs, irrespective of its beliefs, 
its political regime, its level of civilization. It stands, in every case, for leisure, and 
recreation, and freedom, and peace of body and mind. (397)
What we need for politics that would be human (but not “all-too-human”) is an 
opening, a fi ssure in the shell of necessity which constitutes our own imprisonment. 
The anthropologist’s point is clear: a community is founded upon a yearning for 
such cracks which Realpolitik concentrates on sealing. If there is one condition 
under which the fi nal decree of Albany “friends of my soul, you twain, / Rule in 
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this Realm, and the gor’d state sustain” (5.3) makes sense, it is this: the state will 
not heal its wounds unless a crack in the necessity of Realpolitik is discovered 
and widened. The opening through which we will be able to follow the arch 
towards the inaccessible.
28. “Ha? here’s three on’s are sophisticated. Thou art the thing itself […]” (3.4)
When we speak about animality and exposure the theme of nakedness cannot 
be far away. “Is man no more than this?” – Lear’s question come as a response 
to a long speech in which Edgar tries to address the issue of his past identity. 
Lear’s “What hast thou been?” is met with a list of courtly activities largely 
preoccupied with carnal pleasures with a conclusion organized along two lines. 
One groups transgressive behaviour under the auspices of body parts: “False of 
heart, light of ear, bloody of hand.” The other, subsumes negative features under 
the rubric of particular animals: “hog in sloth, fox in stealth, wolf in greediness, 
dog in madness, lion in prey” (3.4). Man disfi gures the body through his or her 
actions, distorts and deviates from the originary use of organs falsifying them or 
putting them to a wrong and evil use. This is a lesson of the fi rst grouping. The 
other demonstrates the misuse of the animal which functions as a refl ection of 
a specifi c type of human (mis)behaviour. Not the animal matters but a human 
being which projects upon it his/ her vice. The humanization of the animal which 
is locked in a kind of negative relation serving as a reference and embodiment of 
human vice. Such a humanization is, in fact, a vilifi cation.
Hence, the necessity of nakedness. Dispensing with clothing (Edgar is almost 
naked, Lear commands “unbutton here”) is synonymous with dropping all screens 
and masks, “the rustling of silks,” and, to quote Edmund again, “the plague of 
custom.” Lear’s sophisticated belongs to the same series amplifi ed by a hint at 
mechanisms of adjustment which regulate human (mis)behaviour. To be naked 
means to be unaccommodated, that is move away from the organization of life 
previously holding its iron rule over us towards a marginal, peripheral zone with 
uncertain rules where our decision, and not the dictate of “the custom,” is manda-
tory. To use Shakespeare’s discourse: to shift from the thing disguised and veiled 
by tactics of accommodation to “the thing itself.” The stripping involved here also 
sheds the previously mentioned mechanisms of the humanization / vilifi cation of 
animals: “Thou ow’st the worm no silk; the beast, no hide; the sheep, no wool; 
the cat, no perfume. Ha? […] Thou art the thing itself; unaccommodated man, 
is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art” (3.4). A naked man 
recognizes his heavy indebtedness to the animal, but, at the same time, admits 
that the credit has been put to wrong uses: instead of showing man for what he/
she is, it was turned against man and consumed for the intricate machinery of 
deception (such as fashion, for instance).
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29. “[…] never, never, never, never, never” (5.3) 
At the end of the play we seem to come back to where we started: distribution 
of political and administrative power. It is Albany now who is in a position of 
Lear carving out portions of land and ministering rights. Death has to give way 
to the demands of the political scene. When Messenger brings in the news about 
Edmund’s death Albany responds briefl y: “That’s but a trifl e here […].” No 
moral evaluations are attempted here; what we deal with is rather a confi rma-
tion of the basic principle of political theology – a division of the world into 
friends and enemies: “All friends shall taste / The wages of their virtue, and 
all foes / The cup of their deservings […]” (5.3). Dying Lear cuts this with 
his fi ve-time repeated never which is an equivalent of Cordelia’s nothing from 
the fi rst act. The excessive and always recurring pretences of politics and its 
pompous discourses can be parried by a nearly inarticulate, repetitive word, 
a sound, an ejaculation, an outcry, which compromises the hollow semantics 
of powers.
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